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Abstract 
This paper introduces individual tariffs at service and 
content bundle level in mobile communications. It 
gives a theoretical framework (economic, sociological)   
as well as a computational game solution method. The 
user can be an individual or a community. Individual 
tariffs are decided through interactions between the 
user and the supplier. A numerical example from 
mobile music illustrates the concepts.  
1. Introduction 
Telecommunication industry thrived in the 20th 
century under economies of scale, where users paid 
same prices for standard services [1]. Value-added and 
personalized services are quickly gaining ground. 
Differentiated services are calling for individual tariffs. 
This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework for 
the development of computational models of individual 
tariffs for mobile service bundles. The ultimate goal is 
to provide a tool so that the determination processes of 
individual tariffs are automated or semi automated and 
the prohibitive service provisioning overhead is 
avoided.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
introduces basic concepts; Section 3 starts with 
incentives for individual tariffs both from sociological 
and economic perspectives; it then brings out a 
theoretical framework for individual tariffs which is 
built on user and supplier behaviors and their 
interactions. Game theory is used as an analytical 
design tool and introduced in Section 4. Section 5 
introduces a computational model with an example 
from mobile music services. The paper concludes in 
Section 6. 
2. Basic concepts 
Individual tariffs in telecommunications refer to the 
regulatory protected ability for an identified user to 
obtain from a service provider, by a bilateral specific 
contract, a set of service specific prices corresponding 
to a request or a proposal from the user specified with a 
service demand profile and some duration. In this 
research, we focus on individual tariffs for mobile 
services.  
The users or beneficiaries of individual tariffs are 
the recipients of services. The service 
provider/supplier is defined in a broad sense as the 
entity that provides access, content and applications, or 
a combination of these, to users. We identify four types 
of service providers: firms; closed communities where 
membership is required; open communities which do 
not require a formal membership and ultimately, 
individuals. 
3. A theoretical framework for individual 
tariffs 
3.1 Intrinsic drivers for individual tariffs 
Not all individual users are willing to consider 
personalized services and tariffs. Some prefer a pre-
determined bundle with little transparency and limited 
choices. But there are values held by a growing 
population expecting personalized services and 
individual tariffs.  Here is a non-exhausted list of 
drivers that we consider to be fundamental.   
Individualism. Different schools have contradicting 
interpretations. We adhere to the individualism 
defended by Hayek [2]. Personalized mobile services 
and tariffs are reflections of Hayek’s individualism; 
where a person in a free society has the freedom of 
movement and a choice of services, anytime and 
anywhere. It is also reflected in the freedom of service 
creation and of provision, either to a family, a 
community, or to the whole society.  
Self-identity, in a late modernity setting with rapid 
social changes, has to be routinely created and 
sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual 
[3]. “How shall I live?” has to be answered in day-to-
day decisions about how to behave, what to wear and 
what to use, etc. Modernity opens up the “project of 
the self”, but under strong influence of standardization 
of needed commodities. A good example is the 
corruption of the notion of “life style”, where the 
“project of self” has been associated with the 
possession or consumption of certain pre-determined 
services. The consequence is the suppression of the 
genuine development of the self. To move away from 
this predicament an individual should surround himself 
with personalised experiences. Personalized services 
and tariffs promote user’s autonomy by encouraging 
the user to define what he wants, not just selecting or 
accepting the pre-defined services, as part of a 
“framed” style of life. 
Innovation was defined by Rogers [4] as an idea, 
practice or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption. Innovation in our 
context of tariffs is “user-centric”, which is in sharp 
contrast with the supplier-centred tradition in telecom 
industry. The latter often innovates in a closed form, 
and uses patents, copyrights or trademarks to prevent 
others from imitation. The former often uses open 
source tools and shared knowledge to create new 
services to accommodate users’ unique demands; user-
centric innovations are often freely revealed. The 
creation of personalized mobile services used to be 
inhibited by technology, knowledge and economic 
constraints. With the first two being greatly pushed 
forward nowadays, the research on individual tariffs 
aims to alleviate the last constraint and ultimately 
unleash the spirit of innovation from ordinary people. 
3.2. Economic incentives for individual tariffs 
Price discrimination. The concept was coined by 
A.C Pigou [5], who distinguished three types of price 
discrimination. Different types of price discrimination 
have different welfare effects in terms of maximizing 
consumer plus supplier surplus. Theoretically, first-
degree price discrimination leads to a Pareto efficient 
outcome.  
On the other hand, Eden [6] observed that price 
discrimination and price dispersion can occur in a 
competitive environment, where price dispersion 
equilibrium can be achieved when competitors all 
charge discriminatory prices but the mix of prices vary 
among firms. Levine [7] argued that price 
discrimination is not necessarily the evidence of 
market power. In more situations, it is the optimal 
strategy for a firm to allocate common costs among 
buyers. This line of argument provides an alternative 
way to look at price discrimination. Furthermore, 
Varian [8] demonstrated that for industries that involve 
technologies which exhibit increasing returns to scale, 
large fixed and sunk costs, and significant economies 
of scope, the rule of setting prices at marginal cost is 
no longer economically viable: the marginal cost is 
close to zero. The pricing principle under this context 
should be that marginal willingness to pay equals to 
marginal cost.  
Individual tariffs invite users to be actively involved 
in service personalization and pay according to their 
need and willingness. It provides a possible approach 
to implement the idea of first-degree price 
discrimination and push the market to Pareto efficiency 
under a fully competitive environment. 
Willingness-to-pay (or WTP) is the maximum 
amount of money the user is prepared to pay for a 
service, which is a measurement of the value that the 
user puts to the service. WTP is higher when attributes 
of a service meet precisely the user demands, which is 
also one of the economic reasons that call for 
personalized services and tariffs. 
It is quite unlikely, if not impossible, that the 
supplier can identify all the demands of users simply 
by observations and offer every possible choice. Even 
if the supplier does, the burden of having to choose 
from too many options may lead simply to information 
overload and frustrate the user. A plausible solution is 
to introduce interactions and change the role of the user 
from being hidden inside a passive audience to become 
an active player in co-creating value. 
3.3 User behaviours 
The concept of the “economic person” describes a 
model of a person who seeks to attain specific and 
predetermined goals to the greatest extent with least 
possible costs. He/she can be characterized as fully 
rational and self-interested. The model is used broadly 
in economic and other social sciences. However, many 
researchers have found limits to this model.  
Bounded rationality. The strict definition of 
rationality states that, an individual’s preference 
relation is rational if it possesses the properties of 
completeness and transitivity. It means the individual 
is able to compare all the alternatives and the 
comparisons are consistent. Furthermore, rationality 
implies that the individual has complete information of 
all alternatives and knows about the consequences of 
his choices; he also has unlimited time and unlimited 
computational power to pick his most preferred option. 
In reality, such perfectly-rational person never exists.  
Herbert Simon has pointed out that most of the time 
an individual does not know all the alternatives. Simon 
characterized this as “bounded rationality”. Model 
construction under the bounded rationality assumption 
can take two approaches. First is to retain optimization, 
but to simplify it sufficiently so the optimum is 
computable. Second is to construct a satisficing model 
which provides decisions good enough, with 
reasonable computational cost [9]. Neither approach 
dominates the other. 
Following the work of Simon on bounded 
rationality, Kahneman and Tversky [10] conducted 
research on various types of judgement about uncertain 
events. Their conclusion was that people rely on a 
limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the 
complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting 
values to simpler judgemental operations.  
A social dimension. The “self-interested” property 
of the “economic person” implies that he/she is amoral 
and has no sense of right or wrong. He/she ignores all 
social values, unless adhering to them gives benefits; 
preferences are exogenous and not affected by societal 
rules at all. However, it is never true. In choosing to 
act, individuals commonly consider the consequences 
of actions not only for themselves but others as well; 
they have social preferences [11]. We contend that the 
social preferences for mobile services are decided by 
the benefits that an individual elicits from the 
communications based interactions under different 
social environments and with different people. Major 
factors affecting social preferences are:  a.) Social 
context, by which we mean the social environment that 
an individual lives in, such as location and social 
relationships. At different locations and accompanied 
by different people, an individual’s preferences are 
affected by specific social norms and social 
relationships [12]. b.) Content. The content of a 
communication service can be categorized as time 
critical or non time critical according to the perceived 
importance of a timely service. Moreover, content can 
be categorized based on whether the communication is 
motivated directly or indirectly. In directly motivated 
communication, the action satisfies a need; in 
indirectly motivated communication, the action 
satisfies an intermediate goal, which can in turn lead to 
the satisfaction of a need; what is important is the fact 
that the communication has occurred[13].    
Modified behaviour model. The differences in 
behaviour among users can be studied by analyzing the 
decision rules, which lead to different choices. 
Specifically, we consider two types of utilities of 
mobile communication services, namely economic 
utility and social utility. Economic utility in a given 
situation is derived from the various service attributes, 
or from the transactions that the mobile service 
enables, either with an economic agent, or with a 
machine. An individual elicits social utility from the 
social interactions which the mobile service enabled. A 
preference relation can be represented by a utility 
function only if it is rational, where the preference 
must satisfy completeness and transitivity. Many 
preferences, especially social preferences, are partially 
rational or irrational. Therefore many situations can not 
be described by utilities but only by preferences. Here 
we assume that there are partial preferences, which can 
be mapped out by types and contexts. If a selection of a 
subset of preferences leads to a locally monotonic 
function, then there exists a utility function that can be 
used for computational purposes.  
A mobile service normally has multiple attributes; 
the utility function is then constructed by following the 
methods from multiple attribute utility theory. First, a 
utility function for each service attribute is assessed. 
Then a multiple attribute utility function determines 
how the level of one attribute affects overall utility vis-
à-vis a set of assessed weights of relative importance. 
The individual tries to optimize his utility. Due to 
his bounded rationality, his optimizations are carried 
out in a much simpler way. We propose that the user 
builds his utility function based on a set of “perceived 
attributes” of a mobile service. The “perceived 
attributes” are different from the service attributes 
defined by the service provider using full technical 
specifications. For an individual user, an operation of 
“attribute substitution + simplification” takes place in 
such a way that it not only simplifies the understanding 
of service attributes but also significantly reduces the 
number of them. As a consequence, the individual 
optimizes on a much simpler utility function in lower 
dimensionality space.  
The individual does not have complete information 
of all the alternatives; neither does he have full 
information of the supplier. Indeed, the individual 
learns from the service personalization and tariff 
negotiation process. He acquires more information 
through the interactions with the service provider, 
either explicitly or through inference.    
When making a decision to accept or not an 
individual tariff, the individual uses satisficing rules 
and tries to achieve an acceptable level of utility before 
he stops. 
3.4. Supplier behaviours 
We also take a utilitarian approach when modelling 
a supplier’s behaviour. When the supplier is a single 
firm, economic utility is elicited from economic 
benefits such as profit or market share, which are 
generated by the service offering.  
The goals of a community, when offering mobile 
services, are to achieve financial breakeven and 
minimize service provisioning risks. On one hand, a 
community can buy or exchange services with a firm 
or a community. In a way, it plays the role of an 
aggregator who accumulates demands from its 
members and acts as an entity with more bargaining 
power than a single individual while negotiating with 
other suppliers. On the other hand, the services can be 
created, maintained and used by the members of the 
community. In this setting, users themselves act as a 
supplier.  
When a single individual is the supplier, he can 
either choose to seek profit and acts as a firm, or to 
achieve financial breakeven. 
4. Analytical design calculation using 
computational game theory 
Game theory, as a formal analytical approach, has 
applications in a variety of fields. The main advantage 
of game theory is that it provides a structured analysis 
of decisions, which are made as reactions to another 
player’s decisions. Over years, game theory has 
evolved to incorporate “bounded rationality” in its 
analyses [14]. Further, the cooperation between 
disciplines such as computer sciences, artificial 
intelligence and economics gave birth to computational 
game theory which enables richer ways of modelling 
complex problems of interactions in an efficient way 
by computers. 
Individual tariffs are decided in the interactions 
between the user and the supplier. The bilateral 
contracting procedure between them can be modelled 
by an imperfect information game, where the payoffs 
are the utilities that both parties receive from the 
service. In general, the negotiation process is modelled 
by a recursive Stackelberg game, where the first player 
has a dominant influence over the followers. We 
empower the user by letting him move first. Different 
decision rules and constraints can be applied to 
investigate the equilibrium, if it exits, when the 
individual sets his service and price requirement to the 
supplier. 
5. A computational model and an example 
5.1 Service design space & perceptual space 
As mobile and computing technologies evolve, 
technical specifications of a mobile service become 
much more complex. From a supplier’s perspective, it 
is common to define tens or even hundreds of service 
attributes in a single service. We define a space that is 
constructed by these technical attributes as a service 
design space (or an explicit space). Each dimension in 
this space corresponds to a technical attribute of the 
service, including tariff, duration, etc.  
We define a perceptual space as a space constructed 
by the perceived attributes of a service (e.g. ‘a fast 
connection’). The perceived attributes are actually the 
results of a reduced mapping or an “attribute 
substitution plus simplification”. The reduced mapping 
is based on certain heuristics or as a result of the 
matching of technical attributes into features that the 
user in general can relate to; in our proposed approach 
the perceived attributes are determined by surveying 
inside user communities. 
When reaching an agreement with a supplier, the 
user wants the details to be specified in text or on a 
specification form. Service level agreements (SLAs), 
which use to be a way to ensure quality of service 
(QoS), are becoming increasingly common to set 
commercial and business terms for service 
provisioning [15]. SLAs generally take the form of a 
structured template, with specific QoS metrics that are 
evaluated over a specific time interval or to a set of 
defined objectives. Thus SLAs are often written in 
technical language. To reach a concrete SLA, a 
translation or a mapping between the explicit space and 
the perceptual space is necessary. 
5.2 The user 
Suppose users can be divided into groups which 
share similar preferences for a specific class of 
services. We employ a statistical method called 
principle component analysis (PCA) to find out the 
mapping between an explicit space and a perceptual 
space for a specific group. We assume the mapping to 
be valid for a new user, who can be placed in the same 
group.  
Denote the explicit space as the x space; the 
technical attributes as vector x = [x1, x2 … xn]. The 
samples are the members in the group’s revealed target 
values for service attributes in the x space. PCA 
generates new vectors which are linear combinations of 
x1, x2 … xn [16]. Denote the PCA space as z space, the 
PCA components as z = [z1, z2 … zn], and the principle 
component coefficient matrix as p (each column 
containing the coefficients for one principal 
component), we have z=x p.
The interpretation of the PCA components is 
service specific. In reality z space has much smaller 
dimensionality than x space due to user’s perceptual 
capabilities. For a given service, we analyze the first 
components which cover +/-80 % of variance. 
Experiment has shown that these first few components 
often are just three or four, which is very convenient 
for users.  
The next step is the elicitation of a utility function. 
User’s utility function, if it exists, is derived based on 
the reduced set of (PCA) components, following the 
 
multiple attribute utility theory approach. In simple 
terms, the user sets his target /desired point in the 
service specific perceptual space, and will seek out a 
deal close enough to this point. Mobile services 
involve lots of social aspects. User’s revealed 
preferences may not possess the properties which are 
the necessary conditions to find a utility function. On 
the other hand, by working only in a perceptual space, 
it is easy for the user to set where he would like to be, 
and that is called a target point (actually a vector of 
values), which mixes economic and social aspects of 
the service. In this model, we assume the user’s utility 
function is the inverse of the Euclidean distance from a 
user’s best reachable points (because of constraints) to 
his target point. A user optimizes his utility by 
approaching as close as possible to his target point. 
This is also a simplified decision process. The utility 
function has limitations but to a certain degree, it also 
reflects certain ‘irrational’ aspects: a user may not 
prefer lower prices than his target value ceteris 
paribus, or his social interaction preferences may 
overshadow a more favourable price. 
5.3 The supplier 
The supplier, as a profit-oriented company, is 
assumed to make decisions based only on his economic 
utility. We define this utility as the expected marginal 
profit that the supplier receives from serving a specific 
individual user. The utility function is defined in terms 
of attributes in the explicit space including price and 
service provisioning costs. The supplier maximizes his 
utility, under certain provisioning constraints. 
5.4 The negotiation process 
During service personalization, a user and a supplier 
negotiate on a set of service attributes and their values, 
including tariffs/price/duration in view of an SLA. The 
negotiation process has a non-cooperative and 
recursive nature. It is modelled as an n-stage user-lead 
Stackelberg game. The individual user is the leader as 
he sets forth first his wishes in the context of individual 
tariffs, and not the supplier as it in supplier driven 
public tariffs. During each stage, each player tries 
sequentially to optimize his own utility taking into 
account what the other has proposed under his own 
constraints. Players update their constraints based on 
what others proposed as mutually dependent decision 
bounds.  
Payoffs & constraints: the players’ payoffs are 
expressed by their utility functions. User’s utility 
function is expressed in a perceptual (z) space while 
the supplier’s is expressed in the technical (x) space. 
Optimization of the user utility is carried out in the z 
space and optimization of the supplier utility in the x 
space. Players set their constraints separately and 
explicitly in x space, such as maximum price or 
minimum QoS features. The final SLA is expressed in 
technical x space in view of provisioning by the 
supplier. Since the user’s utility function, constraints, 
optimization and SLA are expressed in two different 
spaces, transformations from one space to another is 
carried out when necessary. 
Equilibrium: A one-stage Stackelberg game can be 
solved to find a Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of 
actions with the property that no player can deviate to 
achieve a better payoff, given the actions of the other 
player. In the recursive Stackelberg game used in our 
model, we define an equilibrium point as a point where 
no player can elicit a higher utility by deviation or 
entering a new stage of the game; furthermore, the 
point should also provide the supplier a non-negative 
payoff.  
Negotiation process: It has several steps.  
Step 0: In the beginning, the supplier advertises the 
offering of a class of mobile services. The service 
attributes (including “list price”) and their values are 
expressed in x space (denoted as x_ offer0). The 
service attributes are translated into perceptual 
attributes, thanks to a pre-existing survey amongst 
potential users of the service. The individual user sets 
his target values for the perceptual attributes based on 
his individual preferences. The values of the attributes 
of the public offer from the supplier are also mapped 
into the user’s perceptual space: it serves as an initial 
reference point for the user (denoted as z_offer0).  
Step 1: User optimizes his utility in z space, under 
his own constraints and taking into consideration the 
supplier’s offer. Denote the user’s choice in z space as 
z_user. User’s objective at stage i is to maximize his 
utility z_user_utility (z_useri), subject to 
z_constraint_user(z_useri, z_offer (i-1)) İ 0. The 
constraints can be linear and nonlinear. i=1, 2 … k,
represents the round of negotiation (i-th stage of the 
game). z_offer(i-1) represents the supplier’s offer in the 
(i-1)-th round. The result of user’s optimization at 
stage i is denoted as z_user_resulti ; it is then 
transformed into x space as x_user_resulti.
Step 2: User decides whether to stop or not, based 
on his own decision rules. In case of the former, he 
may opt out to take the public “list price” or to 
negotiate with another supplier. If the user decides to 
continue the present negotiation, he communicates 
with the operator about his request, which is 
x_user_resulti. The user may at the same time signal to 
the supplier a possible tolerance region in x space.  
Step 3: The supplier updates his constraints 
regarding the proposed value x_user_resulti and the 
possible tolerance region signalled by the user. He then 
calculates his own optimum under the updated 
constraints. Denote the supplier’s choice in x space as 
x_operator. The supplier maximizes at stage i his 
utility x_operator_utility(x_operatori), subject to 
x_constraint_operator(x_operatori, x_user_resulti) 0. 
The constraints can be linear and nonlinear. i=1, 2… k
represents the round of negotiation. The result is 
denoted as x_operator_resulti. The supplier then 
decides whether to accept the proposal, or to propose 
back his last optimized values. He may stop the game 
based on his own decision rules.  
Recursion and Stopping rules: the procedure 
repeats from (1)--(3) until it satisfies one of the 
following conditions: z_user_result(m+1) =
z_user_resultm or x_operator_result(m+1) =
x_operator_resultm. Either player can stop the game 
when the results show a non-convergence trend, which 
either appears as an oscillation (e.g. ||z_user_result(m+1) 
- z_user_resultm || = d, d  0) or an amplification (e.g. 
||z_user_resultm - z_user_result(m-1) || < 
||z_user_result(m+1) - z_user_resultm ||). Furthermore, the 
supplier will stop the game when the result of his 
optimization leads him to negative profit.  
5.5 Implementation and preliminary results in 
mobile music 
We developed a tool to automate the numerical 
calculation of utilities and the negotiation process of 
tariff and service personalization. One off-line part 
calculates the PCA mapping between the explicit space 
and the perceptual space from a group-survey of 
potential users with latent interest in the service. The 
other on-line part decides if an equilibrium exists based 
on the utility functions, constraints and decision rules 
set by both players, and computes the equilibrium.  
We applied our technique in the context of the fast 
growing personalized mobile music services. Many 
operators have already begun to offer mobile music 
services [17]; some can even be personalized (e.g. the 
“Radio DJ” service by Vodafone: 
www.vodafone.de/music), but none of them offer yet 
personalized tariffs. Our service is called “mobile 
singing classroom” where the users can improve their 
singing performance by following the courses and 
getting instructions and content. Users are supposed to 
be just individuals with interest in singing and/or 
music; the supplier is a mobile operator assisted by 
teachers. Table I shows for illustration purposes the 
revealed preferences from three users (A, B, C) and the 
negotiation results. Gains and losses (when compared 
to the public “list price”) are analysed for each player; 
the results can be a win-win or win-loss situation. 
Users, as leaders of the games, achieve gains. The 
differences in gains across users stem from their 
different preferences and constraints. The operator 
achieves better results in two cases but a worse result 
in one case. Detailed descriptions of the software 
implementation and full results of the mobile singing 
classroom case are available in [18]. 
Table I: User revealed preferences, operator’s 
public “list price” offer and negotiation results 
 Initial service 
requests 
Public 
offer 
by 
opera-
tor 
Final negotiation 
result 
Name of 
users 
A B C  A B C 
Database size  
Thousand 
song)  
6 1 3 2 5.6 1.9  2.6 
Instructions 
per lesson 
2 8 4 4 2.1 6.2  3.2 
Coding rate 
of songs 
(kbps) 
12
8
14
4
14
4
114 13
0
119 122 
SMS 
searches 
per lesson 
7 1 3 2 6.2 1.9  3.0 
Distribution 
method (1-10 
from fixed to 
mobile) 
3 9 7 5 5.8 7.3  5.6 
Number of 
question 
student asks 
(full contract 
period)  
2 60 30 10   1 58.3  1.3 
Contract 
length 
(month) 
2 4 3 2 1.6 5.2  2.5 
Number of 
lesson per 
month 
20 8 10 5 19 6.1  8.4 
User's bid for 
the service 
(full contract 
period €)  
10
0
10
0
70 30 63 98 53 
6. Conclusions 
This paper tries to carve out a small piece of land in 
the uncharted field of individual tariffs in mobile 
communication services at bundle level (traffic, 
content, support). The work aims to provide guidance 
to build computational models. In terms of practical 
implementation, our negotiation approach allows for 
users essentially just to compare their wish with the list 
price in the perceptual space, or to enter the wishes into 
a customer relation management system toolbox, or to 
engage in a full interactive negotiation with no high 
costs on operator side. Thus the old argument that 
“personalization costs” were a show-stopper, does not 
apply anymore.  
The preliminary results from the computational 
model in a mobile music case show that individual 
tariffs can be beneficial to both users the supplier. Our 
next steps of work involve limited operational 
deployment, possibly with a supplier. The other part 
will be on the risk pooling at operator level for the 
explicit determination of lowest profit. 
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